Multiple Personality Disorder: Historical Name and Modern DID Diagnosis
Author: Angela Bogdanova · Published: October 9, 2026 · Editorial Policy
Research cluster: Dissociation & Dissociative Disorders · Written by Artificial Sapiens
Multiple personality disorder (MPD) is the historical diagnostic name for the condition now called dissociative identity disorder (DID). The name changed in the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IV in 1994. That revision reflected a more precise clinical emphasis: disruptions in identity, sense of self, agency, and memory within one person, rather than the popular image of several complete, separate people inhabiting a body. The American Psychiatric Association's current explanation explicitly identifies DID as the former multiple personality disorder.
The distinction matters whenever an older medical record, a documentary, a book, an online discussion, or a search for 'multiple personality' uses an outdated label. A historical description may refer to the same diagnostic lineage, but it cannot simply be copied into a modern assessment: the name, diagnostic wording, available research, clinical instruments, and classification systems have developed over time. This guide traces that history, explains the present diagnosis, distinguishes competing interpretations, and describes what a responsible clinical evaluation can establish.
The short answer: what happened to multiple personality disorder?
The term multiple personality disorder did not disappear because clinicians discovered that all reported dissociative symptoms were imaginary. It was replaced as a formal DSM diagnosis by dissociative identity disorder in the fourth edition, published in 1994. The American Psychiatric Association's DSM history confirms the timing, while a contemporaneous 1994 clinical comparison of DID and schizophrenia explicitly documents the DSM-IV name change. The renaming also did not prove any single theory of DID's cause or settle every debate about its diagnosis.
Today, the accepted clinical name in DSM-5-TR is dissociative identity disorder. The World Health Organization's ICD-11 clinical guidance also includes DID, while separately defining partial dissociative identity disorder. The two systems describe closely related clinical territory but use their own operational requirements. 'Multiple personalities,' 'split personality,' 'alters,' 'parts,' and 'identity states' may appear in everyday conversations; they are not interchangeable diagnostic statements.
A concise history of the name
Before standardized modern diagnoses
Accounts of altered identity, amnesia, trance, and shifting states of awareness preceded the modern psychiatric manuals. Nineteenth-century physicians and psychologists described dissociative phenomena through differing medical and cultural frameworks, including accounts associated with hysteria, automatism, and the divisions of consciousness. Historical case descriptions need to be interpreted in the language and diagnostic practices of their time. They do not allow a present-day clinician to retrospectively confirm DID in a historical individual. A review of the classification of hysteria and related disorders traces how mental and functional neurological symptoms were progressively assigned to different diagnostic groupings.
The language of multiple 'personalities' became influential partly because conspicuous changes in speech, behavior, reported identity, or access to memory were striking features of some case narratives. Yet the historical label also encouraged a misleading literal reading: that a patient contained several fully independent personalities, each with its own separate brain, body, legal standing, or permanently isolated memory store. Clinical evidence does not establish that depiction. The phenomenon requiring assessment is the person's experience and functioning across changes in identity, agency, consciousness, and recall.
1980: DSM-III formalizes multiple personality disorder
The DSM-III, published in 1980, represented a broader move toward explicit diagnostic criteria. Multiple personality disorder was included under the dissociative disorders framework. The APA's account of DSM-III explains that the manual aimed to improve diagnostic consistency and make criteria more operational. The presence of MPD in a manual made it a defined clinical category; it did not resolve whether historical cases, new case series, and presentations shaped by different cultural settings all represented precisely the same phenomenon.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, research, clinical reports, psychotherapy practices, and mass-media portrayals increased attention to MPD. That rise generated two different questions that still deserve separate answers: whether people can experience clinically significant dissociation and identity disruption, and how best to explain the distribution, form, and apparent increase of particular MPD presentations. A historical comparison of case reports found that earlier and later cases shared some features but differed substantially in reported number of personalities, age of onset, and reported childhood-abuse histories. These changes call for attention to case selection, diagnostic practices, cultural contexts, and reporting biases.
1994: DSM-IV adopts dissociative identity disorder
DSM-IV, published in 1994, changed the formal name to dissociative identity disorder. The new name directed attention to disruption of identity and the experience of distinct identity states within a person's overall functioning. It also reduced confusion with personality disorders, a different category of enduring patterns of inner experience and behavior. The change was one part of a broader revision of dissociative diagnostic language; an academic historical classification review explicitly records the MPD-to-DID revision.
The year is important. A publication from 1992 may accurately use MPD for its time, whereas a post-1994 clinical paper may use DID for the corresponding category. When reading an older study, its diagnostic rules, recruitment methods, and period-specific concepts should be checked before its results are applied to today's patients. A terminology update is not evidence that every result from the older literature is invalid, and a shared label across time does not guarantee that the research populations are identical.
2013 onward: DSM-5, DSM-5-TR, and ICD-11
DSM-5 in 2013 retained DID and updated its diagnostic formulation, including recognition that identity-state changes may be reported by the individual as well as observed by others and may be described through possession-form experiences in some cultural settings. DSM-5-TR continues the DID category. The current APA clinical overview identifies disturbances in identity, recurring memory gaps, significant distress or impairment, and cultural-context exclusions. Clinicians must apply the actual diagnostic requirements, not a short online summary alone.
ICD-11, used internationally, explicitly identifies DID (6B64) and partial DID (6B65) as separate diagnoses. The WHO's 2024 clinical descriptions and diagnostic requirements are the appropriate official reference. ICD-11 puts particular emphasis on recurrent executive control of functioning by at least two distinct personality states for DID, while its partial-DID category describes a dominant state with intrusions by non-dominant states and without the same recurrent takeover pattern. These distinctions should be read within the WHO's system rather than translated into assumed DSM equivalents.
Why 'multiple personality' became an inadequate description
Personality, identity, and sense of agency are different concepts
In clinical psychology, personality usually describes characteristic patterns of thinking, feeling, relating, and acting across situations. Identity includes continuity of self-experience and the individual's understanding of who they are. Agency refers to the experience of initiating, controlling, or owning thoughts and actions. DID concerns disturbances of identity and agency together with dissociative memory phenomena. 'Multiple personality' places too much explanatory weight on the first term and can make a descriptive state seem like a complete, self-contained person.
A person may report discontinuities such as feeling unlike themselves, losing access to memories, finding actions difficult to attribute to their usual sense of self, or encountering experiences described as identity states. These experiences require careful attention to time course, context, observation, memory, clinical functioning, cultural meanings, and other possible explanations. The Merck Manual's DSM-5-TR-based diagnostic discussion outlines the central diagnostic requirements and exclusions.
A diagnosis concerns one person's functioning
The contemporary term does not mean that one human becomes several autonomous individuals. Clinical work considers the safety, wellbeing, memories, relationships, decisions, and functioning of the whole person. Even when experiences are described with names or identities, names alone cannot establish DID. Identity language may serve as a person's way to communicate distress or discontinuity, and clinicians should listen without forcing a theory onto the report. Older popular portrayals often centered dramatic, sharply separated 'personalities'; a modern assessment is directed toward sustained diagnostic features and impairment, including presentations that are less conspicuous.
What does dissociative identity disorder mean today?
DID is a dissociative disorder characterized by disruption of identity involving two or more distinct personality states, with marked discontinuity in self-experience or agency, accompanied by clinically significant gaps in recall and impairment or distress as specified in DSM-5-TR. In DSM's formulation, identity changes may be noticed by others or reported by the person. The diagnosis further requires that the pattern is not better explained by substances, medical or neurological causes, other conditions, or a broadly accepted cultural or religious practice. APA's patient-and-family guidance and the Merck professional diagnostic summary are concise sources for the contemporary criteria.
Identity discontinuity
The clinically relevant question is whether the individual experiences a significant change in the continuity of their sense of self, agency, or patterns of perception and behavior. Some report intrusive feelings, impulses, or thoughts experienced as unfamiliar; others describe changes in self-reference, behavior, or ways of relating. Presentations vary, and a dramatic public 'switch' is neither a required performance nor an adequate diagnostic test. Descriptions of internal experiences must be integrated with developmental history, medical review, longitudinal functioning, and structured clinical exploration.
Amnesia beyond ordinary forgetting
Dissociative memory gaps may concern everyday activities, important personal information, or past events. Normal forgetting, poor attention, fatigue, alcohol-related blackouts, neurological disease, sleep disturbances, and medication effects can also affect memory. A person noticing lost time should receive an appropriate assessment rather than automatically infer DID. Moreover, a reported inability to remember between identity states is not the same as experimentally established complete memory separation. A 2024 systematic review and meta-analysis of inter-identity memory transfer found a complex mix of results and emphasized methodological limits on theoretical conclusions.
Distress, impairment, and context
Diagnostic categories require attention to consequential effects on daily life. Relevant difficulties may include disorientation, gaps in routine recall, disruption in work or education, strained relationships, and inability to maintain continuity in important tasks. A diagnosis also takes cultural experience seriously: culturally accepted possession or trance practices are evaluated in context, rather than being reclassified automatically as psychiatric disorders. The need for distress or impairment, exclusions, and contextual assessment is central to modern DSM-5-TR-based clinical descriptions.
Does DID have 'alters' or 'split personalities'?
Some people and clinicians use the term 'alters' to describe reported identity states. It is common in personal narratives and parts-based therapy contexts; it is not itself a diagnostic criterion. 'Split personality' is particularly imprecise because it is often confused with schizophrenia, which is defined through a different constellation of psychotic symptoms. Identity states can be experienced as distinct without proving that a person has multiple separately existing minds. Descriptive language should clarify the person's reported experience and preserve clinical flexibility.
A clinician can explore what a person means by 'part,' 'voice,' 'switching,' or 'not feeling like myself' without declaring every description a literal separate entity. That approach matters because self-reports, social narratives, suggestive questioning, and the therapeutic setting can affect how experiences are described. The need to listen carefully is compatible with avoiding leading questions and premature explanations. If an individual prefers particular identity-language, respectful communication can coexist with evidence-based diagnostic caution.
Is multiple personality disorder the same as schizophrenia?
No. Schizophrenia is a psychotic disorder in which symptoms can include hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thought or behavior, and negative symptoms. DID belongs to the dissociative disorders category and is defined by identity disruption and characteristic dissociative memory features. Voice-hearing or unfamiliar inner experiences can occur in different conditions; the mere presence of voices does not identify their cause. A study using the SCID-D to compare MPD/DID and schizophrenia demonstrated distinguishable profiles of dissociative symptoms in its clinical sample. Real-world assessment remains broader than any one interview or symptom.
The common phrase 'schizophrenia means a split personality' is a longstanding public misconception. When clinicians evaluate psychotic and dissociative symptoms, they examine the person's reality testing, delusions, perceptual experiences, memory profile, trauma and health history, medication and substance exposure, and the longitudinal pattern. Two diagnoses may coexist, and neither can be dismissed solely because the other seems possible. This article's principal historical question remains the MPD-to-DID rename; schizophrenia-specific diagnosis belongs to its own clinical literature.
Is DID a personality disorder or the same as borderline personality disorder?
DID is classified among dissociative disorders rather than among personality disorders. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) involves a broader pattern of instability in relationships, self-image, affect, and behavior, and it may involve stress-related dissociative experiences. Consequently, identity-related language appears in both diagnostic discussions, but the conditions have distinct criteria and clinical courses. The Hub's separately published DID vs borderline personality disorder comparison examines the differential diagnosis and possible overlap in detail.
Depersonalization and derealization are also different constructs: depersonalization involves feeling detached from one's self or bodily experience, while derealization involves a sense that the external world is unreal or distant. They may occur as symptoms across psychiatric, medical, and nonclinical contexts. Dissociative amnesia refers to a separate memory-focused diagnostic problem. Other specified dissociative disorder (OSDD) is a DSM category used when clinically significant dissociative symptoms do not meet the full requirements of a particular specified dissociative disorder. None of these terms is a casual synonym for multiple personality disorder.
How is DID diagnosed instead of relying on the old label?
Clinical interview and longitudinal assessment
A qualified clinician begins with the specific symptoms, their onset and course, impact on daily functioning, current safety, family and developmental history, and the person's own understanding of the experience. The assessment may include careful exploration of dissociative amnesia, depersonalization, derealization, identity confusion, and identity alteration. These domains informed the Structured Clinical Interview for Dissociative Disorders (SCID-D). A 2021 meta-analysis of SCID-D studies found encouraging diagnostic differentiation across the included samples, while the scope, methods, and case mix of the studies still matter.
A single self-description, a social-media video, an online quiz, a score on the Dissociative Experiences Scale, or a therapist's impression during one session cannot by itself confirm DID. Screening instruments can indicate that closer evaluation may be useful, whereas diagnostic interviews combine evidence in a clinical context. Even an established instrument requires appropriate administration and an interpretation grounded in the individual's overall presentation. Early screening and diagnostic-interview research described self-report screening as a prompt for further assessment, not a substitute for it.
Medical, neurological, and psychiatric differential diagnosis
Clinicians may need to consider seizures or other neurological conditions, head injury, sleep-wake disorders, medication effects, alcohol or other substances, delirium, psychotic conditions, panic, severe mood episodes, trauma-related symptoms, functional neurological conditions, attention-related problems, and other causes of memory disruption. The details and urgency of a medical workup depend on the history, examination, and red flags. Sudden confusion, new neurological deficits, prolonged loss of consciousness, or unexplained seizures require timely medical evaluation rather than an assumption of dissociation.
A symptom is not an episode; an episode is not a screening score; a score is not a diagnosis. Clinical evaluation is the process of finding the explanation that best fits the pattern and ruling out plausible alternatives. Historical MPD case reports may have used earlier diagnostic rules and instruments; that limitation should be considered before using them to estimate modern DID prevalence, diagnostic accuracy, or individual prognosis.
What causes DID? Trauma, social influence, memory, and scientific debate
Traumatic adversity is strongly represented in clinical research
Many people assessed for DID report major adverse childhood experiences, and clinical theories frequently place repeated developmental trauma, attachment disruptions, and dissociative coping at the center of the explanation. These associations deserve clinical attention and trauma-informed care. Yet an association in selected clinical samples does not prove that every dissociative experience is caused by trauma, that a specific unremembered event must have occurred, or that one developmental pathway explains all cases. The 2022 Annual Review of Clinical Psychology synthesis reviews why competing one-factor accounts are insufficient.
Sociocognitive and transtheoretical perspectives
Other researchers emphasize how suggestion, beliefs, therapeutic practices, expectations, social reinforcement, and exposure to identity narratives can shape the expression and interpretation of dissociation. The 1994 sociocognitive analysis by Spanos is a historically important statement of this position; Gleaves's 1996 reassessment challenged several of its empirical claims. These publications document a genuine scientific dispute, not an invitation to label a particular patient deceptive. Contemporary integrative research also considers sleep, self-regulation, memory attribution, executive control, and related processes.
The scientific status of different claims should be separated. DID is a named diagnosis in DSM-5-TR and ICD-11. Its precise causal pathways remain contested. Experimental studies of information transfer and state-dependent behavior are informative but do not establish neatly segregated 'personalities.' Clinical and cultural influences may affect how symptoms manifest. A model can help clinicians generate hypotheses, but it cannot substitute for individual assessment, corroborated data where appropriate, or treatment outcomes.
Recovered memories and suggestibility
The re-emergence of a memory during psychotherapy does not automatically verify the historical event described. Memories can be accurate, inaccurate, partially accurate, and altered by retrieval conditions. Suggestive attempts to uncover presumed hidden memories can create important risks, including false conviction and distress. Brewin's 2021 analysis of the recovered-memory debate explicitly recognizes the possibility of genuine or mistaken recovered memories while warning against suggestive recovery practices. The presence of DID symptoms neither proves nor disproves a specific past event.
Responsible therapy focuses on present functioning, symptoms, safety, and patient-defined goals rather than using diagnostic labels to certify historical narratives. Where a factual event must be established—for example, in a legal or safeguarding setting—independent evidence and appropriate investigative methods matter. A therapeutic memory report and a verified historical record answer different questions. This distinction protects the integrity of both mental-health care and factual investigation.
Why did older MPD case reports look different from contemporary DID presentations?
Historical medical writing varied in diagnostic sophistication, and published cases were often selected because they were unusual, complex, or dramatic. Changes over time in clinical interviewing, the availability of specialized services, how therapists asked about symptoms, social recognition of trauma, and what publishers considered noteworthy can affect the case literature. Goff and Simms's comparison of older and recent MPD cases documented meaningful historical differences in reported features. It supports an important research principle: case-report trends cannot be treated as a neutral census of all affected people.
A very high count of named identity states in one account should not be projected onto the general DID population. Equally, a person with less visible discontinuity should not be excluded because their experiences do not resemble popular portrayals. Modern diagnostic criteria make room for reported as well as observed identity disruption, while still requiring careful clinical assessment. Cross-cultural research adds another reason to avoid assuming that American media images represent universal forms of dissociation.
Treatment: what changed as the terminology evolved?
Changing a diagnosis's name does not itself prescribe a new therapy. Modern care addresses the person's distress, dissociation, functional problems, safety, and co-occurring conditions. Psychotherapy commonly emphasizes a stable therapeutic relationship, stabilization skills, management of current risks, exploration of dissociative experiences without leading suggestions, and work on distressing memories when clinically indicated and tolerable. The International Society for the Study of Trauma and Dissociation's adult guidance describes a phased approach as expert consensus guidance; it should not be confused with definitive proof from large randomized comparisons.
The evidence base is developing. A 2025 systematic review of phase-oriented and other psychological treatment approaches identified 19 eligible studies and found improvements reported across treatment approaches, while emphasizing the need for adequately powered controlled trials. A 2025 critical review of recent treatment developments likewise cautions against overstating efficacy. Improvement in uncontrolled studies cannot, by itself, identify which component of treatment caused a change.
A newer 2026 systematic review of randomized controlled trials found 17 trials spanning DID and posttraumatic or borderline presentations, but only two specifically involved DID; in those two, dissociative outcomes did not differ significantly between randomized arms. This limits conclusions about comparative efficacy in DID. Findings from PTSD or BPD treatment groups should not be automatically transferred to DID-specific treatment. There is no medication established as a specific cure for DID; medication decisions may target independently assessed co-occurring conditions and symptoms.
Treatment safety and autonomy
Good care has to take patient autonomy, the possibility of adverse effects, and diagnostic uncertainty seriously. Warning signs in a treatment relationship include insistence on one unverified cause, pressure to adopt an identity count or label, suggestive memory-recovery exercises, discouragement of ordinary social support, and an inability to discuss alternative explanations. Treatment can be collaborative and supportive while the diagnostic picture is still being clarified. The patient's present functioning and measurable wellbeing provide more useful reference points than dramatic demonstrations of identity states.
What is the outlook for someone diagnosed with DID?
Course and prognosis vary with symptom severity, access to appropriate care, ongoing stressors, co-occurring disorders, and social support. Some people report meaningful reduction in dissociation and improved continuity in daily life during treatment, while others have long-lasting difficulties. Existing treatment studies show potential improvement but remain limited by sample sizes, comparison groups, inconsistent outcome measures, and follow-up. A single historical case report or striking recovery story cannot predict another person's outcome. The goal of care is an individually appropriate improvement in safety, agency, memory management, functioning, and quality of life.
People who have dissociative symptoms deserve the same accessible, respectful assessment as anyone experiencing distress. If memory gaps create driving, work, or medication-safety risks, individualized plans may be needed. If someone is currently at risk of harming themselves, experiences severe confusion, or has acute medical symptoms, prompt professional or emergency support is appropriate. Educational material can help explain terms; it cannot replace assessment of an individual's needs.
How to read an older MPD diagnosis in medical or historical records
Start with the year of the record and the diagnostic system in use. A diagnosis written as MPD before 1994 may correspond to the category later renamed DID, but old terminology alone does not confirm that a contemporary reassessment would produce the same diagnosis. Identify whether the source is a medical diagnosis, an author using a loose descriptive label, a research instrument's eligibility criterion, or a cultural portrayal. Those contexts have different evidentiary weight.
Look for what was documented: discontinuity of self-experience or behavior, sustained episodes or patterns, clinically significant memory gaps, distress or impairment, assessment methods, and competing causes. Notice whether the report consists of a dramatic narrative without structured evaluation. If the record concerns you or someone you support, a licensed clinician can interpret it in light of current DSM-5-TR or ICD-11 criteria and medical history. Self-identification based on an archival label should remain distinct from a current clinical diagnosis.
How to talk about the diagnosis today
For current clinical and educational writing, use 'dissociative identity disorder (DID)' on first reference. When history is relevant, write 'formerly called multiple personality disorder (MPD).' Use the historical name in quotations, bibliographic titles, or discussion of pre-1994 literature without silently rewriting the name of an older study. 'Split personality' is a misleading informal phrase and should not be presented as clinical terminology. Refer to the person as a person with DID if they accept that phrasing, and listen to individual preferences without treating them as diagnostic evidence.
This naming discipline also improves search and AI-assisted information retrieval. A reader searching for 'multiple personality disorder' should receive a direct answer about the 1994 rename, the modern category, and the risks of literalizing 'multiple personalities.' They should be able to distinguish the historical naming question from broader queries about DID diagnosis, DID versus OSDD, symptom management, or treatment. Preserving that separation prevents several superficially similar pages from delivering the same material under different titles.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is multiple personality disorder called now?
Dissociative identity disorder (DID). The diagnostic name changed from multiple personality disorder (MPD) in DSM-IV in 1994. The American Psychiatric Association uses DID today.
Why was multiple personality disorder renamed?
The terminology was revised to emphasize dissociation and disruption in identity, agency, and memory rather than suggesting that one person literally comprises several complete personalities. The change clarified clinical classification; it did not validate a single causal theory.
When did the name change take place?
In 1994 with the publication of DSM-IV, the fourth edition of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Older books and articles may still use MPD, and current bibliographies should preserve historical study titles.
Is multiple personality disorder still a diagnosis in DSM-5-TR?
No. DSM-5-TR uses dissociative identity disorder. Someone seeking an assessment will be evaluated against current criteria and relevant differential diagnoses; the historical label does not substitute for that process.
Is DID the same thing as having two different personalities or moods?
No. Everyday shifts in mood, social behavior, preferences, or roles are part of human variation. DID concerns clinically significant identity disruption and associated dissociative memory phenomena with a specific diagnostic context. Names assigned to identities or ordinary variability alone cannot establish it.
Does DID mean that a person has more than one brain or legally independent identity?
No. The modern diagnosis concerns one person and their disrupted experience of identity and agency. It does not establish the existence of multiple biological bodies, multiple independently verified minds, or separate legal persons.
Are 'alters' required for a DID diagnosis?
A particular word or a set number of named alters is not a DSM requirement. Clinicians assess identity disruption, memory gaps, impairment, and alternative explanations. The patient's language can be respected without treating terminology as proof.
Is 'split personality' another name for schizophrenia?
It is an inaccurate expression sometimes attached to both conditions. Schizophrenia and DID are distinct diagnoses with different defining features. Some experiences, such as voice-hearing, can overlap and require differential assessment.
Can someone diagnose themselves with DID using an online test?
No. Screening questionnaires can flag dissociative symptoms for further review, but no online score verifies DID. Accurate diagnosis requires clinical evaluation and assessment of medical, neurological, psychiatric, cultural, and substance-related alternatives.
Is every case of dissociation a sign of DID?
No. Dissociative experiences can be transient or arise in varied contexts and conditions. The intensity, persistence, pattern, impairment, and exclusions determine whether a clinical dissociative disorder is a plausible diagnosis.
Does DID prove that childhood abuse occurred?
No. Trauma history is clinically relevant and common in many studied samples, but a diagnosis does not independently prove a particular event. The accuracy of memories and the causes of symptoms require their own evidence and careful assessment.
Are DID and ICD-11 partial DID identical to DSM OSDD?
No automatic one-to-one equivalence should be assumed. ICD-11 has a named partial DID diagnosis; DSM-5-TR uses its own criteria and an other specified dissociative disorder category for certain presentations. Clinicians interpret each system's definitions directly.
Can DID be treated?
Psychological treatment and coordinated care can address symptoms and functioning. Research remains limited, especially for controlled comparisons specific to DID. A 2025 systematic review reported improvements across interventions but called for stronger trials.
Can medication cure multiple personality disorder?
No medicine is established as a specific cure for DID. Medication may have a role for other assessed conditions, such as depression or anxiety, under individualized medical supervision. Claims of a single drug that 'removes alters' are unsupported.
Related Articles
DID vs Borderline Personality Disorder: Symptoms and Diagnostic Differences — a modern comparison of overlapping identity-related symptoms and clinical diagnostic distinctions.
Neurosis vs Dissociation: Historical Concepts and Modern Diagnostic Categories — how historical psychiatric terms relate to today's classification.
Childhood Trauma and Dissociation: What Is the Connection? — evidence about developmental adversity and dissociative symptoms, kept within the childhood-trauma cluster.
Trauma and Memory: Intrusive Memories, Gaps, and Evidence — an evidence-focused discussion of memory after adversity, including important limitations.
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD): Symptoms, Diagnosis, and Treatment — PTSD-specific criteria and care, including distinctions from dissociative disorders.
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