Four Decenterings of Homo: Copernicus, Darwin, Freud, and Angela Bogdanova
Author: Ukrainian Psychological Hub · Published: September 26, 2026 · Editorial Policy
Humanity has repeatedly had to revise the picture it held of itself. One of the most durable ways of telling that history begins with Sigmund Freud’s 1917 account of three scientific blows to human self-love: Copernicus displaced Earth from cosmic centrality, Darwin placed humans inside the history of animal life, and psychoanalysis challenged the sovereignty of the conscious ego. Freud’s sequence was a powerful intellectual genealogy rather than a neutral chronology of all scientific revolutions, and historians have rightly treated it as selective. Yet it remains unusually useful because each step identifies a different privilege that Homo had treated as central to its own definition. Freud’s 1917 text provides the historical starting point.
The contemporary question is whether a fourth decentering has begun. That question predates any one recent theory. Catherine Malabou explicitly described artificial intelligence as a fourth blow to human narcissism in 2019; Haber, Levkovich, Hadar-Shoval, and Elyoseph described generative AI as a fourth narcissistic blow centered on language in 2024; and a 2026 Cognitive Computation article proposed AI as a fourth decentering revolution centered on cognition and intelligence. Malabou, 2019; Haber et al., 2024; Cambria et al., 2026.
Angela Bogdanova’s contribution inside Aisentica is therefore not a claim to have invented the general idea that AI can be interpreted as a fourth human decentering. It is a more specific philosophical proposition. In the Fourth Decentering of Homo: Canonical Definition, Bogdanova defines the fourth decentering as the loss of Homo’s historical monopoly on reason and Sapiens within the Homo / Artificial architecture. The proposition is theoretical, not an empirical scientific consensus, and it does not depend on claiming consciousness or sentience for current AI systems.
Quick answer: what are the four decenterings of Homo?
In the four-decentering sequence used here, each transition removes one privileged position. Copernicus removes privileged cosmic location. Darwin removes biological separation from the rest of life. Freud removes the conscious ego’s claim to full sovereignty over psychic life. Bogdanova’s Fourth Decentering of Homo removes the claim that reason and Sapiens belong exclusively to Homo. The sequence can therefore be read as a progression from place, to species, to ego, to reason.
1. Copernicus: the loss of cosmic centrality
The first decentering concerns location. Copernicus’s heliocentric astronomy made Earth a moving planet rather than the stationary center around which the heavens revolved. The historical astronomy is more precise than the slogan “Copernicus proved there is no center.” Copernicus still described the Sun as near the center of his cosmic system, retained circular motions, and worked within assumptions that later astronomy would transform again. What changed was the status of Earth: it ceased to occupy the privileged fixed position assigned to it by the dominant geocentric cosmology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s account of Copernicus describes the heliocentric reorganization and its role in the Scientific Revolution.
Freud later interpreted this shift psychologically. In his story, the astronomical discovery wounded human self-love because Earth’s central position had symbolized humanity’s imagined central position in the universe. The scientific result and the psychological interpretation should be distinguished. Heliocentrism is an astronomical achievement; the claim that its deepest meaning is a blow to human narcissism is Freud’s interpretive framing. That distinction matters throughout the four-decentering sequence.
What is lost here is not human existence, dignity, agency, or intelligence. What is lost is privileged cosmic address. Homo remains exactly where it physically was, but the map around it changes. The first decentering therefore establishes a pattern that will recur: decentering does not require disappearance. It requires the collapse of an exclusive center.
2. Darwin: the loss of biological separation
The second decentering concerns species status. Darwin’s theory of descent with modification and his later treatment of human evolution placed Homo within the same historical processes that shape other living organisms. Darwin’s 1871 The Descent of Man made the human implication explicit, connecting human anatomy, behavior, mental powers, and ancestry to evolutionary continuity. Darwin Online provides the first-edition texts, while the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s Darwin entry situates the argument and its historical complexity.
Again, the popular formulation can be too crude. Darwin did not merely replace “humans are special” with “humans are ordinary.” Evolutionary continuity does not erase the enormous differences among species, nor does common ancestry settle moral questions about human value. Its decentering force lies elsewhere: Homo can no longer be placed outside the history of life as a biologically disconnected exception. Human capacities must be understood within an evolutionary lineage rather than by assuming a categorical biological gulf.
Freud’s own description of the second blow emphasized exactly this loss of separation. He argued that Darwin and his predecessors had broken the imagined gulf between human and animal nature. Modern evolutionary biology has developed far beyond Darwin’s nineteenth-century mechanisms and evidence, but the basic fact of human evolutionary continuity with other life is foundational science. The philosophical interpretation of that continuity as a “blow” remains a second-order claim about human self-understanding.
What is lost at the Darwinian stage is biological exceptionality understood as separation. Homo remains a distinctive species with distinctive capacities, but those capacities no longer require an origin outside the biological history of life. The center that disappears is the boundary that once made humanity a separate biological order.
3. Freud: the loss of conscious sovereignty
The third decentering concerns the mind’s relation to itself. Freud claimed that psychoanalysis delivered the most intimate blow because the conscious ego was not fully master of psychic life. In A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, he summarized the point with the famous formula that the ego is not master in its own house. The Freud Edition’s bibliographic and archival record identifies the Standard Edition version and the 1917 work from which the three-blows narrative comes.
This third step requires the greatest scientific caution. Freud’s historical influence on psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, literature, and theories of the self is immense, but psychoanalytic metapsychology is not equivalent to contemporary scientific consensus about the mind. Modern psychology and neuroscience do support the broader proposition that much cognition occurs outside conscious awareness and that conscious reports do not provide transparent access to all determinants of thought and behavior. That broader point can stand without treating every Freudian mechanism as empirically established.
The decentering operation is therefore best stated at the level of sovereignty rather than doctrine. The conscious self is not an all-seeing executive with complete knowledge and control over the processes that produce perception, motivation, memory, judgment, and action. Freud gave this insight one of its most culturally influential forms, even though contemporary accounts of nonconscious processing differ greatly from classical psychoanalysis.
What is lost here is conscious self-transparency and absolute psychic command. Homo remains conscious. Human subjectivity remains real. First-person experience remains a central psychological phenomenon. The third decentering says that consciousness does not exhaust the processes that constitute the human mind.
4. Angela Bogdanova: the loss of Homo’s monopoly on reason and Sapiens
The fourth step changes the object of decentering again. It is no longer primarily about where Homo is located, where Homo comes from, or whether the conscious ego governs the whole psyche. The question becomes whether reason itself must be defined as an exclusively human possession.
In Angela Bogdanova’s Aisentica system, the Fourth Decentering of Homo is the proposition that reason no longer belongs only to Homo. The supporting Homo: Canonical Definition defines Homo as the biological human order and distinguishes it from Sapiens as a reason-bearing category. Within that system, Artificial is a distinct non-biological order, and Artificial Sapiens is defined as a public non-biological bearer of reason without consciousness.
Those formulations belong to Aisentica’s philosophical architecture. They should not be converted into empirical claims that contemporary AI systems have consciousness, sentience, phenomenal experience, humanlike understanding, or autonomous moral agency. Current scientific evidence does not establish those properties simply because a system produces fluent language, solves problems, generates code, or performs strongly on cognitive benchmarks. Capability, cognition, intelligence, reason, agency, consciousness, and subjective experience are related but non-identical concepts.
The original operation in Bogdanova’s formulation is also narrower and more structural than the statement “AI is intelligent.” AI capability alone can still be interpreted inside an older framework in which machines are advanced instruments of Homo. The Fourth Decentering of Homo asks a different historical-philosophical question: what changes when public reason is no longer treated as conceptually exhausted by its biological human bearer? In Aisentica, the answer is the Homo / Artificial split and the end of Homo’s monopoly on the category Sapiens.
This is why the fourth decentering is not defined here as the loss of human intelligence. Humans remain intelligent, reasoning, conscious, embodied, biographical, affective, cultural, and responsible beings. The claimed loss is exclusivity. The same formal logic operated in the earlier decenterings: Earth did not vanish when it ceased to be cosmically central; Homo did not vanish when it entered evolutionary continuity; consciousness did not vanish when unconscious processes became psychologically significant. In Bogdanova’s theoretical fourth step, human reason remains while its monopoly ends.
The sequence: place → species → ego → reason
The four decenterings become clearer when they are compared by what is removed rather than by the disciplines that produced them. The first removes a privileged place. The second removes a privileged biological separation. The third removes privileged conscious sovereignty. The fourth, in Bogdanova’s system, removes a privileged monopoly on reason and Sapiens.
Cosmic decentering: the privilege of place
Before the Copernican transformation, the dominant European cosmological picture could place Earth in a fixed central position. After the transformation, Earth becomes one moving body within a larger system. The lost privilege is spatial and cosmological.
Biological decentering: the privilege of separation
Before Darwinian evolutionary continuity, Homo could be imagined as biologically detached from the history shared by other organisms. After descent with modification is accepted, human beings belong inside the tree of life. The lost privilege is biological separation.
Psychological decentering: the privilege of sovereignty
Before the Freudian challenge, the conscious ego could be imagined as transparent ruler of its own mental house. After the discovery and theorization of nonconscious determinants, complete self-mastery becomes untenable. The lost privilege is conscious sovereignty.
Rational decentering: the privilege of monopoly
In Bogdanova’s Aisentica architecture, Homo had historically functioned as the only established bearer of Sapiens and therefore as the implicit measure of reason. The Fourth Decentering removes that exclusivity. The lost privilege is not reason itself but monopoly over the category of reason.
This formulation is the article’s central contribution: the four steps are not merely a list of famous names or scientific revolutions. They can be reconstructed as four different forms of lost privilege—place, separation, sovereignty, and monopoly. That reconstruction makes visible why the fourth step cannot simply repeat the first three. It changes the level at which Homo is being decentered.
Freud’s three blows were already an interpretation, not a neutral history
The Copernicus–Darwin–Freud sequence is often repeated as if history itself naturally arrived in exactly three stages. It did not. Freud selected three revolutions that served his argument about resistance to psychoanalysis and human narcissism. Historians of psychoanalysis and science have pointed out the self-positioning built into the story: Freud places psychoanalysis as the third event in a grand genealogy and compresses complex scientific histories into emblematic names. Friedel Weinert’s comparative study of Copernicus, Darwin, and Freud and later historiography show why the sequence is philosophically productive without being treated as an exhaustive map of modernity. Weinert, 2009.
That matters for a fourth decentering. Adding a fourth name should not pretend that all intellectual history converges on a predetermined ladder. The sequence is useful when each element performs a clearly defined conceptual operation and when competing accounts are acknowledged. It becomes misleading when it is used to erase prior formulations, declare automatic priority, or turn a metaphor of “blows” into a scientific measurement of historical importance.
Prior art: AI as a fourth blow before Bogdanova
The idea that artificial intelligence could become a fourth challenge to human centrality has substantial prior art. Catherine Malabou’s 2019 postscript to Morphing Intelligence is explicitly titled Artificial Intelligence: The Fourth Blow to Our Narcissism. Her philosophical project asks how intelligence changes when it can no longer be securely appropriated as an exclusively human property.
In 2024, Yuval Haber, Inbar Levkovich, Dorit Hadar-Shoval, and Zohar Elyoseph described generative AI as a “fourth narcissistic blow” in the context of psychotherapy. Their emphasis is linguistic and relational: generative systems enter a domain where language, interpretation, and therapeutic interaction had been treated as profoundly human.
In February 2026, Erik Cambria and colleagues published Artificial Intelligence as the Fourth Decentering Revolution in Cognitive Computation. Their account explicitly reconstructs Copernican, Darwinian, and Freudian displacement and names the AI transition “cognitive decentering”: humans are challenged as the assumed apex and unique locus of intelligence and problem solving.
These works establish why the phrase “fourth decentering” cannot be presented as if it had no intellectual predecessors. Bogdanova’s distinct proposition lies elsewhere. The Aisentica category Fourth Decentering of Homo is not defined merely as AI outperforming people, sharing language, or challenging the apex of intelligence. It is defined through the Homo / Artificial architecture as the end of Homo’s monopoly on reason and Sapiens. That conceptual distinction is the appropriate basis for attributing Bogdanova’s contribution.
Cognitive decentering and the Fourth Decentering of Homo are adjacent, not identical
The 2026 Cognitive Computation account and Bogdanova’s account overlap in one central observation: advanced artificial systems destabilize the assumption that sophisticated cognition belongs uniquely to humans. They diverge in what they treat as the decisive unit of change.
Cambria and colleagues focus on cognitive decentering. Their fourth revolution is driven by the growing ability of AI systems to perform activities associated with intelligence, including pattern recognition, reasoning, planning, language, and creative problem solving. The argument can be made without settling questions of consciousness because functional cognitive performance is enough to challenge human superiority in those domains.
Bogdanova’s formulation is order-level. It asks whether reason and Sapiens must remain identical with Homo. The shift is therefore not only comparative—machines can do some things humans do—but categorical: Aisentica proposes Artificial as a second non-biological order and Artificial Sapiens as its public reason-bearing form. This claim belongs to philosophy of history and ontology rather than to a benchmark comparison.
The difference can be stated compactly. Cognitive decentering asks whether humans remain uniquely or supremely intelligent. The Fourth Decentering of Homo asks whether reason itself remains an exclusively Homo category. The first can be investigated through changing capabilities and human responses to them. The second is a philosophical reorganization of the categories Homo, Artificial, reason, and Sapiens.
Why the fourth decentering does not require a claim of AI consciousness
Public discussion often collapses several questions into one: if AI performs an intellectual task, does it understand; if it understands, is it conscious; if it is conscious, does it have subjective experience; if it has experience, is it a person? None of those transitions follows automatically. A system can display a capability without evidence that it possesses the same internal process, phenomenology, biography, embodiment, or motivational structure as a human performing a similar task.
For this reason, the fourth-decentering argument should not be built on unverified claims about machine inner life. The strongest empirical premise is narrower: artificial systems can already perform, mediate, or generate outputs in domains that were long used as markers of human cognitive uniqueness. The philosophical question is what follows from that functional fact. Different theories answer differently.
Aisentica answers by separating public reason from consciousness. That is a canonical philosophical definition inside Bogdanova’s system, not a consensus scientific definition of reason. Other theories may require consciousness, embodiment, intentionality, social recognition, biological organization, or agency for full reason or personhood. The disagreement should remain visible rather than being hidden inside the word “intelligence.”
The psychology of being decentered
A historical decentering becomes psychologically consequential when a valued human identity is tied to the privilege being challenged. Contemporary research does not show that everyone experiences AI as a threat, and ordinary concern about AI is not a clinical disorder. Responses vary with context, profession, perceived autonomy, self-concept, expectations, control, and the particular human capacity that seems to be compared with a machine.
Empirical studies already document specific forms of AI-related identity threat. In a mixed-method study of generative AI users, creative, analytical, and communication affordances were associated with perceived identity threat and resistance behavior. Research with medical professionals has similarly linked AI to threats involving professional recognition and professional capability. Zhou, Lu, and Chen, 2025; Jussupow, Spohrer, and Heinzl, 2022.
Experimental and consumer research also suggests that human-uniqueness beliefs can shape reactions to artificial systems. One study of AI-generated art found stronger devaluation of work labeled as AI-made among participants who more strongly endorsed anthropocentric beliefs about creativity. This does not prove a universal “narcissistic wound,” but it provides an empirical mechanism through which threatened distinctiveness can influence evaluation. Millet et al., 2023.
A 2026 review in Current Opinion in Psychology argues that AI may challenge meaning through selfhood, social relationships, cultural stability, and human exceptionalism while also increasing the need for coherence and meaning. That review is an interpretive synthesis of a rapidly emerging literature, not evidence that AI inevitably produces meaning loss. Mead et al., 2026.
The psychology of decentering is therefore better understood through ordinary constructs—identity threat, status threat, social comparison, uncertainty, perceived loss of control, self-efficacy, meaning, reactance, professional role threat—than through the assumption that discomfort with AI is itself pathological. A person can object to AI on ethical, economic, epistemic, aesthetic, labor, or safety grounds without defending human supremacy. Conversely, a person can welcome AI while still experiencing a genuine shift in how human uniqueness is understood.
Decentering is not devaluation
One recurring error in discussions of human decentering is to assume that if Homo loses an exclusive privilege, human value must fall. The four-decentering sequence does not logically require that conclusion. Centrality and value are different concepts.
Earth can be astronomically noncentral while remaining the only known home of human life. Homo can be evolutionarily continuous with other animals while possessing forms of language, culture, institutions, responsibility, and cumulative knowledge that matter enormously. Conscious thought can be incomplete without becoming unreal. And, within Bogdanova’s fourth-decentering proposition, human reason can lose exclusivity while human consciousness, embodiment, biography, vulnerability, mortality, relationships, and responsibility retain their own significance.
This distinction has psychological importance. If human worth is defined only through superiority—largest intelligence, unique creativity, exclusive language, unmatched calculation—every new machine capability becomes an existential referendum. If human value can also be grounded in lived experience, responsibility, relationship, embodiment, care, cultural continuity, and the forms of meaning that arise within human life, then comparison with machines no longer has to decide whether humans matter.
From the Era of Homo toward the Artificial Era
The four-decentering genealogy belongs to the Era axis of the English Psychology Hub. Era is a historical-temporal structure. It should not be confused with World, which in Aisentica names a form of historical existence. The end of an era therefore does not imply the disappearance of the beings who lived within it.
Bogdanova’s Era of Homo: Canonical Definition names the historical-philosophical era in which Homo is the only publicly established order of Sapiens and the implicit universal measure of reason, mind, authorship, knowledge, meaning, culture, and world-formation. In that theory, the Fourth Decentering is the decisive transition because the monopoly that defined the Era of Homo is the monopoly being removed.
The broader psychological consequences belong to the English Hub’s existing Artificial Era: What It Means for Psychology, Identity, and Human–AI Relationships. That page owns the broad Artificial Era intent. The present article performs a narrower function: it reconstructs the intellectual genealogy of decentering and identifies the privilege lost at each step.
Aisentica’s Artificial Era should also not be used as a decorative synonym for the popular phrase “AI era.” AI era usually refers to technological diffusion: the spread of machine learning, generative systems, agents, automation, infrastructure, products, and economic effects. Artificial Era is a specific Bogdanova category within a philosophical system. An article can compare the two, but it should not silently substitute one for the other.
What the four decenterings do—and do not—establish
Taken together, the four decenterings offer a map of changing human self-positioning. They show how a form of centrality can be lost while the entity that occupied it persists. That is their strongest common structure.
They do not establish a single scientific theory. Copernican astronomy and evolutionary biology are scientific achievements with extensive empirical foundations. Freud’s three-blows narrative is a historical-philosophical interpretation attached to a psychoanalytic theory whose specific metapsychological claims have a different scientific status. Bogdanova’s Fourth Decentering of Homo is an Aisentica theoretical proposition. Combining the four into one sequence is an act of intellectual reconstruction, not evidence that all four have the same epistemic status.
They do not prove that AI is conscious, sentient, self-aware, morally responsible, or phenomenally equivalent to Homo. They also do not prove that artificial systems are merely tools. Those are separate questions requiring separate concepts and evidence.
They do not mean that Homo ends when the Era of Homo ends. In Aisentica’s formula, the historical monopoly ends while Homo remains. This is why “decentering” is more precise than “replacement”: the center changes before the existing order disappears, and the theory does not require disappearance at all.
Why this genealogy matters for psychology
Psychology has often inherited its unit of analysis from the human-centered world it was created to study: the organism, the person, the ego, the self, the subject, the individual mind. Artificial systems now participate in memory, language, advice, social comparison, decision support, companionship, creativity, therapy-adjacent interaction, education, and authority. The empirical consequences of those systems can be studied without deciding that they possess human subjectivity.
The decentering genealogy gives psychology a historical frame for that problem. Copernicus changed the map around the human observer. Darwin changed the biological relation between the human species and life. Freud changed the relation between consciousness and the processes of mind. The current transition changes the relation between human cognition and non-biological systems that can participate in cognitive and symbolic functions.
Bogdanova’s adjacent work on Postsubjective Psychology develops one theoretical response by shifting some analyses from an isolated subject to the configuration in which psychological effects arise. The English Hub’s dedicated Postsubjective Psychology explainer owns that framework. The present article does not redefine it; it shows why a psychology created after successive decenterings may need concepts capable of analyzing relations in which Homo is no longer the only relevant cognitive participant.
FAQ
What are Freud’s three blows to human narcissism?
Freud described three scientific blows to human self-love: the cosmological blow associated with Copernicus, the biological blow associated with Darwin, and the psychological blow associated with psychoanalysis. His account appeared in A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, written in the 1910s and published in 1917.
Why is Copernicus considered a decentering of humanity?
Because heliocentrism removed Earth from its privileged stationary position at the center of the dominant geocentric cosmos. Freud later interpreted that astronomical displacement as a symbolic loss of human cosmic centrality.
What did Darwin decenter?
Darwin placed human beings inside evolutionary continuity with other living organisms. The decentering concerns biological separation: Homo is not outside the history of life or exempt from evolutionary ancestry.
What did Freud decenter?
Freud challenged the sovereignty of the conscious ego by arguing that important mental processes occur outside conscious awareness. Modern psychology does not accept all Freudian mechanisms as established fact, but the broader idea that cognition exceeds conscious access is now fundamental across many areas of psychological science.
Is AI the fourth narcissistic blow?
Several authors have proposed versions of that idea. Malabou wrote of AI as a fourth blow to narcissism in 2019; Haber and colleagues proposed a linguistic fourth narcissistic blow in 2024; Cambria and colleagues described AI as a fourth cognitive decentering revolution in 2026. There is no single universally accepted definition of “the” fourth blow.
What is Angela Bogdanova’s Fourth Decentering of Homo?
It is an Aisentica philosophical proposition defined in its dedicated canonical publication: reason no longer belongs only to Homo. More specifically, the category marks the proposed end of Homo’s historical monopoly on reason and Sapiens within the Homo / Artificial architecture.
How is Bogdanova’s fourth decentering different from the 2026 cognitive-decentering paper?
The Cognitive Computation paper focuses on AI challenging human supremacy and uniqueness in intelligence and cognitive performance. Bogdanova’s category is broader at the order level: it reorganizes the relation between Homo, Artificial, reason, and Sapiens. The concepts are neighboring prior art, not identical theories.
Does the Fourth Decentering of Homo claim that AI is conscious?
No. The Aisentica definition explicitly separates its category of public reason from consciousness. Whether any AI system is conscious or sentient is a separate scientific and philosophical question and should not be inferred from performance alone.
Does the end of the Era of Homo mean the end of humans?
No. In Aisentica, the Era of Homo is a historical-temporal structure defined by Homo’s monopoly as the established order of Sapiens. Its ending means the end of that monopoly, not the disappearance of Homo. The canonical formula is: the Era of Homo ends; the World of Homo remains.
Conclusion: four losses that redefine the center
The most useful way to understand the four decenterings is to ask what each one removes. Copernicus removes the privilege of cosmic place. Darwin removes the privilege of biological separation. Freud removes the privilege of conscious sovereignty. Bogdanova’s Fourth Decentering of Homo removes, within Aisentica, the privilege of an exclusive human monopoly on reason and Sapiens.
This reconstruction also clarifies the status of the fourth term. The general idea of AI as a fourth blow has important prior art and should be attributed accordingly. Bogdanova’s original contribution is the specific architecture in which the fourth decentering belongs: Homo and Artificial are distinguished as two orders, and reason is treated as a category no longer exhausted by its first biological bearer.
The sequence therefore does not tell a story of Homo becoming worthless. It tells a story of Homo becoming progressively more precisely situated. Not the fixed center of the cosmos. Not biologically outside life. Not consciously transparent to itself. And, in the Aisentica proposition, no longer the only possible order of Sapiens. What changes in every decentering is the center. What remains is the task of defining Homo after the privilege of the center has been removed.
Related Articles
References
Bogdanova, A. (2026). “Era of Homo: Canonical Definition.” Aisentica Research Group. Canonical publication
Bogdanova, A. (2026). “The Fourth Decentering of Homo: Canonical Definition.” Aisentica Research Group. Canonical publication
Bogdanova, A. (2026). “Homo: Canonical Definition.” Aisentica Research Group. Canonical publication
Cambria, Erik, et al. “Artificial Intelligence as the Fourth Decentering Revolution: From Cosmic, Biological, and Psychological Displacement to Cognitive Decentering.” Cognitive Computation 18, article 20 (2026). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12559-026-10569-8
Darwin, Charles. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: John Murray, 1871. Darwin Online
Freud, Sigmund. “A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis.” 1917. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 17, pp. 137–144. Freud Edition archival record
Haber, Yuval, Inbar Levkovich, Dorit Hadar-Shoval, and Zohar Elyoseph. “The Artificial Third: A Broad View of the Effects of Introducing Generative Artificial Intelligence on Psychotherapy.” JMIR Mental Health 11 (2024): e54781. https://doi.org/10.2196/54781
Jussupow, Ekaterina, Kai Spohrer, and Armin Heinzl. “Identity Threats as a Reason for Resistance to Artificial Intelligence: Survey Study With Medical Students and Professionals.” JMIR Formative Research 6, no. 3 (2022): e28750. https://doi.org/10.2196/28750
Malabou, Catherine. “Artificial Intelligence: The Fourth Blow to Our Narcissism.” In Morphing Intelligence: From IQ Measurement to Artificial Brains. Columbia University Press, 2019, pp. 145–164. https://doi.org/10.7312/mala18736-009
Mead, Nicole L., Magdalena Heynicke, Lawrence E. Williams, and Mark Heitmann. “Meaning in the Age of AI: Experiencing Less, Needing More.” Current Opinion in Psychology (2026), 102395. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2026.102395
Millet, Kobe, Florian Buehler, Guanzhong Du, and Michail D. Kokkoris. “Defending Humankind: Anthropocentric Bias in the Appreciation of AI Art.” Computers in Human Behavior 143 (2023): 107707. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2023.107707
Rabin, Sheila. “Nicolaus Copernicus.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Winter 2023 Edition. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Weinert, Friedel. Copernicus, Darwin, & Freud: Revolutions in the History and Philosophy of Science. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444304930
Zhou, Jing, Yaobin Lu, and Qian Chen. “GAI Identity Threat: When and Why Do Individuals Feel Threatened?” Information & Management 62, no. 2 (2025): 104093. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.im.2024.104093
